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Abstract:   In  1991  the  Ethiopian  Peoples’  Revolutionary  Democratic  Front  
(EPRDF) introduced policies aimed at recognizing the country’s long-standing  
religious  diversity,  providing  a  public  arena  for  religious  groups,  and  
maintaining a sharp division between religion and the state. This further eroded  
the  traditionally  dominant  position  of  the  Ethiopian  Orthodox  Church,  
strengthened Protestant Christian and Muslim communities, and created a more  
flux and competitive configuration among the religious communities. Seeking to  
maintain its political power, the EPRDF has at the same time made efforts to  
monitor  and  control  the  different  religious  communities.  Therefore,  the  last  
twenty  years  have  been  marked  by  uneven  developments,  in  which  the  
government’s  accommodating  attitudes  have  been  interlaced  with  efforts  to  
curtail  the  influence  of  the  religious  communities.  This  paper  surveys  the  
intersection  and  reciprocal  influences  between  EPRDF policies  and  religious  
communities  over  the  last  twenty  years,  and  discusses  how  Muslims  and  
Christians (Orthodox and Protestant) have negotiated their roles in relation to  
politics and public life. These developments have, the paper argues, led to the  
emergence  of  divergent  and  competing  narratives,  reconfiguring  self-
understanding, political aspirations and views of the religious other. The EPRDF  
ideology  of  'revolutionary  democracy'  has,  in  this  sense,  enabled  religion  to  
surface  as  a  force  for  social  mobilisation  and  as  a  point  of  reference  for  
attempting to define nationhood in Ethiopia. 
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The 1991 political transition announced a new era for Ethiopia’s Christian and 
Muslim communities. The Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front (EPRDF) issued new 
policies and introduced a  legal  framework aimed at  recognizing the country’s  inbuilt 
diversity. The lifting of earlier restrictions on religious expressions made religion more 
visible in public, and led to a sharp increase in religious activities and religious diversity,  
in  effect  strengthening Protestant  and  Muslim communities  and counterbalancing the 
traditional hegemonic position of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC). 
This paper surveys the intersection of EPRDF’s policies and the reconfiguration 
of the religious landscape in contemporary Ethiopia. By assessing the legal and political 
parameters for religions in post-Derg Ethiopia, the paper demonstrates how the ruling 
party provided a government-independent framework for religious plurality, yet at the 
same time sought to control and monitor religious activities. The paper also explores the 
strategies adopted by Muslims and Christians (Orthodox and Protestant) in maneuvering 
under  such  circumstances,  and  points  to  how  the  increasing  religious  activities  and 
diversity have intensified debates about religion and politics – and about being Ethiopian. 
Political and legal parameters for religion in Ethiopia
The religious policies of the present Ethiopian government are remarkably different from 
any of the previous ones with regard to the measure of religious freedom they provide. 
During the Imperial Government of Haile Selassie modernizing impulses had already led 
to  tentative  provisions  of  religious  liberty,  like  freedom  of  worship,  recognition  of 
shari’a courts, and provisions for the registration of religious associations, but these were 
not put into practice, and the EOC retained its monopoly and political power until the 
revolution of 1974.ii 
In  this  revolution,  religious  freedom  became  one  of  the  passionately  voiced 
demands. These were initially realized to some degree, for example with the acceptance 
of Islamic holidays as public holidays, the permission to establish the Ethiopian Islamic 
Affairs  Supreme  Council  (EIASC),  and  with  Pentecostals  allowed  to  congregate  in 
public. However, the revolutionary rulers' turn to scientific socialism soon brought about 
polemic campaigns against religion as well as the violent co-optation of the old religious 
center  of  the  Ethiopian  highland  state,  the  EOC.  This  process,  culminating  in  the 
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deposition, murder, and replacement of Patriarch Theophilos in 1976, signaled the end of 
whatever  religious  freedom  the  revolution  had  brought.  In  the  following  years  all 
Pentecostal and many Protestant churches were closed, and Muslims in Eastern Ethiopia, 
accused of siding with the Somalis during the Ogaden-war, were hit hard by the  Derg. 
After the political consolidation of Mengistu’s regime and as a result of the humanitarian 
crisis of the 1980s, some faith communities were given a measure of religious freedom in 
exchange for their participation in the political system. The constitution draft commission 
of 1986, for example, not only included the Orthodox patriarch, but also leaders from the 
Lutheran Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY), the Catholic Church 
and the EIASC. Members  from these religious  communities  were also elected to  the 
Shengo.iii 
When  the  EPRDF  ousted  the  Derg in  1991,  religious  liberties  were  quickly 
introduced at an unprecedented scale. This had little to do with ideological differences to 
the Derg regime,iv but more with a different political strategy of appropriating religion. 
On the one hand, their reliance on rural peasants for revolting against the Derg had taught 
the new rulers to respect the deep-seated religious sensibilities of most Ethiopians,v and 
on the  other  hand  the  religious  plurality  of  Ethiopia  dovetailed  nicely with  the  new 
governing philosophy of ethno-regional federalism, as is stated in Article 13 of the new 
constitution: “[t]he national emblem on the flag shall reflect the hope of the Nations, 
Nationalities, Peoples as well as religious communities to live together in equality and 
unity.” Accordingly, article 11 marks a clear separation of religion and state, rules out a 
state  religion  and  provides  the  assurance  of  no  government  interference  in  religious 
matters  and vice  versa.  Article  27 warrants  freedom of  religion,  belief,  and opinion, 
which includes the right of believers to “establish institutions of religious education and 
administration  in  order  to  propagate  and  organize  their  religion.”  Furthermore,  the 
constitution opens up the possibility for the recognition of religious marriage ceremonies 
and of religious courts relating to personal and family issues (arts. 34,  78). The new 
government also brought an end to restrictions on the  hajj,  suspended the ban on the 
import of religious literature and eased the restrictions on the construction of mosques 
and religious schools.vi The Imperial regulations regarding the registration of religious 
communities now were put into practice, resulting in the first official recognition of many 
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Protestant  and  especially  Pentecostal  churches.  These  churches  also  succeeded  in 
reclaiming property that was dispossessed by the  Derg and were given land grants for 
burial sites and church buildings.
However, the laws pertaining to the registration of religious organizations with the 
government  may also  be  seen  to  contradict  the  constitutional  provisions  of  religious 
freedom and equality. The EOC is still exempt from registration by the Civil Code of 
1960, whereas for all others registration is a legal mandate. The Penal Code of 1957 and 
its  replacement,  the 2004 Criminal  code,  contain punishments  for participating in,  or 
leading the activities of an unregistered association.vii Furthermore, the Legal Notice of 
1966, which still governs the process of registration, states that an application may be 
denied  if  the  purposes  of  the  association  are  found to  be “unlawful  or  immoral,”  or 
“against  national  unity  and  interests.”viii However,  so  far  there  is  no  indication  that 
applications have been denied for anything but formal reasons.
Another area in which the current legislation may lead to government interference 
with religious activities pertains to land use. All land is owned by the State according to 
article 40 of the constitution, but the relevant legislation governing the lease of urban and 
rural land does not address issues related to religious bodies, such as how to prioritize 
applications, whether to lease land to very small religious communities, or how churches, 
mosques, or cemeteries should be placed within the infrastructure of a settlement. All of 
these decisions are delegated to local governments where the influence of a religious 
majority may guide decisions. 
Thus, comparing the present situation of religious politics with previous Ethiopian 
governments, there has been an evident improvement with regard to religious liberty and 
equality. The Ethiopian constitution promotes religious plurality, which is supported by 
the separation of religion and state, the promulgation of religious freedom, as well as 
provisions for religious courts  and institutions  of religious propagation.  However,  the 
legal  framework  for  registrations  and  land  lease  gives  considerable  power  to  the 
executive,  which  corresponds  with  the  EPRDF's  interest  to  closely monitor  religious 
communities, being conscious about the potential power they represent. This concern has 
led to government interventions contradicting the legal provisions for religious freedom 
as will be shown below.
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The impact of EPRDF politics on religion
The combination of increasing religious plurality and executive influence on religions has 
played  out  quite  differently  for  the  Orthodox,  Protestant  and  Muslim  communities, 
producing dissimilar trajectories in the renegotiation of public space, political power and 
religious freedom.
Plurality and fragmentation
The current religious composition of Ethiopia is  characterized by the 2007 census as 
follows: Ethiopian Orthodox Christians hold the majority with 43.5 percent, followed by 
Islam (34.0 percent), and Protestant Christianity (18.5 percent).ix There is a considerable 
regional variation with regard to religious predominance. Muslims are dominant in the 
Afar  Region  (95.3  percent),  Dire  Dawa (70.8  percent),  Harar  (69.0  percent)  and  the 
Somali Region (98.4 percent), as well as in the special enumeration areas (92.5 percent). 
Orthodox  Christianity  predominates  in  Addis  Ababa  (74.7  percent),  Amhara  Region 
(82.5  percent),  and  Tigray  Region  (95.6  percent),  whereas  Gambella  and  Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region are largely Protestant (71.1 and 55.5 percent, 
respectively). Even religiously heterogeneous regions, such as Oromiya are made up in 
part  of  fairly homogenous zones.  Furthermore,  in all  regions,  religious  majorities are 
amplified in rural areas, which shows that religious plurality in Ethiopia is first of all an 
urban phenomenon.  The religious  distribution  in  Ethiopia  therefore  largely correlates 
with regional and ethnic boundaries, making it compatible with the EPRDF's political 
philosophy of ethno-regional federalism.
One of the most significant demographic shifts that the census indicates is the 
rise of Protestantism, which grew from 5.5 percent of the overall population in 1984,x to 
10.2  percent  in  1994,xi to  the  already mentioned  18.5  percent  in  2007.  Most  of  this 
increase has come at the cost of the EOC, whose share declined from 54.0 percent in 
1984 to 50.6 percent in 1994, and 43.5 percent in 2007. 
The increase of Protestantism is accompanied by a significant and still  growing 
influence of Pentecostal and Charismatic beliefs and practices. Ethiopian Pentecostalism 
began  to  emerge  in  the  1960s,  but  was  marginalized  and  for  the  most  part  actively 
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repressed during Haile Selassie’s government and the Derg.xii However, with the policies 
of religious freedom inaugurated by the EPRDF, Pentecostal churches have become a 
highly  visible  part  of  Ethiopian  Protestantism,  especially  since  their  theology  and 
practices  have  spread  to  mainstream Protestant  churches  as  well,  where  speaking  in 
tongues,  ecstatic  praise,  prophesy,  exorcisms,  and  healing  prayers  now  are  common 
phenomena.  All  of  the  large  mainline  Protestant  denominations  have  accommodated 
Pentecostal beliefs and practices in their doctrinal statements and regulations,xiii and the 
conflation  of  Pentecostalism and Protestantism has  an  organizational  correlate  in  the 
Evangelical Churches’ Fellowship of Ethiopia (ECFE), which comprises Pentecostals and 
mainline  Protestants  at  once.  In  public  discourse,  all  Protestants  are  labeled  “Pente”, 
which at first was a polemic practice by the Derg to stigmatize all Protestants,xiv but now 
has become a self-designation for many of them as well.
Due to their previous repression under the Derg, most Protestants were in no need 
of a political realignment, perhaps with the exception of the EECMY, which after the 
murder of its general secretary Gudina Tumsa – an outspoken critic of the  Derg – had 
taken a more compliant stance. Therefore, when the EPRDF came to power, the church's 
president, Francis Stephanos did not run for reelection due to his previous involvement in 
the Shengo.xv There was, however, no further realignment or immediate political conflict 
in the church regarding this issue. 
In general, Protestant churches have benefited greatly from the changes in religious 
policy. All of them immediately re-emerged in public in 1991 and successfully reclaimed 
their  formerly  dispossessed  property.  Despite  occasional  local  difficulties,  it  became 
much easier for Protestants to secure land for church construction and for burial grounds, 
which had been a notoriously difficult issue before. This is especially significant in areas 
to which they previously had hardly any access to. In the largely Orthodox town of Bahir 
Dar,  for  example,  Protestants  erected  tall  churches  on  land  granted  to  them  by  the 
government,  which  visibly  compete  with  Orthodox  buildings.  This  increased  public 
visibility of Protestantism in Orthodox areas has led to a number of clashes and riots, 
during which government forces have usually protected the Protestant gatherings.xvi
The registration mandate was generally welcomed by Protestant churches, since for 
many of them – especially those not operating under the umbrella of foreign missions – 
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this was the first time they could obtain official recognition. Moreover, the organizational 
requirements for registration and the legal recognition it awards are largely compatible 
with Protestant church models and their tendencies to grow via fragmentation. A list of 
registered  associations  obtained  from  the  Ministry  of  Justice  in  2004  indicates  the 
mushrooming of Protestant associations. Of the 291 religious denominations, churches, 
and ministries in this list, the absolute majority belongs to the Protestant fold and many of 
them are Pentecostal or Charismatic. 
The  separation  of  church  and  state  also  has  led  to  a  noticeable  increase  of 
Protestants  and Pentecostals  in  government  positions,  in effect  weakening the former 
political influence of the EOC. The most prominent Protestant government official is the 
current foreign minister, Haile Mariam Desalegne, who belongs to the Hawariyat Church, 
a large Pentecostal denomination, which however, is ostracized by all other Christians 
since it does not accept the dogma of the trinity.
So far, this new public space for Protestants has not been limited by the EPRDF in 
any significant way, but its policies nevertheless affect the churches’ internal dynamics. 
One  area  for  this  is  the  ethnicization  of  politics.  The  issue  has  had  an  especially 
significant impact on the EECMY, which due to its mission history in Western Ethiopia 
has a strong Oromo base.xvii When the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) fell out with the 
government  in 1992 and resorted to armed struggle,  the church tried to stay clear of 
political involvement with the OLF. At the same time, however, it resumed relations with 
the Berlin Mission, which is a vocal supporter of the OLF and actively aids its relief and 
development wing, the Oromo Relief Association (ORA). While this issue of whether 
and how to speak out on behalf of Oromo rights continues to be a politically difficult 
balancing act,  the question of ethnicity erupted  within the church over the use of the 
Oromo language in church services in Addis Ababa.  A large number of Addis Ababa 
churches  resisting  the  introduction  of  Oromo  language  services  left  the  EECMY, 
registering under the name of Addis Ababa and Surrounding Mekane Yesus Church.xviii 
This spurred court cases regarding the use of the name and the involved property. After 
many negotiation attempts, the parties were officially reconciled in February 2010.xix
In these kinds of church splits,  which have also occurred in  many of the large 
Protestant  churches  over  different  issues,  the  government  functions  as  a  regulatory 
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instance  through  its  policies,  especially  the  requirement  of  registration.  The  need  to 
conform to certain standards with regard to uniqueness of name, organizational structures 
or financial oversight, imposes limitations on church fragmentation and simultaneously 
defines areas of church conflict. In some cases, like in the EECMY split, the government 
may  even  assume  an  active  role  in  conflict  resolution  and  the  celebration  thereof.xx 
However, outside of these regulatory confinements, occasional executive issues of land 
allotment, and similar problems, there are no indications of direct government influence 
in Protestant churches or political pressure on them.
Renegotiating central powers
The violent co-optation of the EOC during the  Derg, the expropriation of its property, 
and  ideological  campaigns  against  religion  had  curtailed  the  political  power  and 
independence  of  the  church.  Therefore,  when  the  EPRDF  came  to  power,  the  EOC 
leadership once again was strongly impacted,  most evident  in  the replacement  of the 
patriarch in 1991. This was a controversial process, which was driven by a conflation of 
government and church politics. 
An internal  observer’s report  of the Tenth Parish Council  General Assembly in 
October of 1991 reveals a conflicting and deeply divided church.xxi Patriarch Merkorios is 
noted to have “verbally resigned in August due to illness and the pressure of work.” A 
number of clergy and lay people apparently partook in public demonstrations, partially 
instigated by the General Secretary of the Church, who was then removed and replaced 
with a government appointment. This was a clear violation of the EPRDF’s policy of 
non-interference  in  religious  matters,  but  the  underlying  motives  are  unclear.  While 
public  demonstrations  certainly  were  not  acceptable  to  the  new  government,  it  is 
questionable whether the EPRDF was interested and capable of replacing the church’s 
leadership only a few months after taking over Addis Ababa. Moreover, the absence of 
dissenting voices in the internal report may indicate that the faction who sought to replace 
the patriarch had already taken over within the church. 
Political tensions resulting from the Derg’s deposition and replacement of Patriarch 
Theophilos now played out in reverse. The Holy Synod replaced its chairman in February 
1992 and in June elected Abuna Paulos as the new patriarch, enthroned on 12 July 1992. 
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Paulos was a protégé and political ally of the former Patriarch Theophilos, for whom he 
had worked as a contact person to the World Council of Churches (WCC), becoming 
Bishop for Ecumenical Affairs in 1975. When Theophilos was deposed and murdered by 
the  Derg in 1976, Paulos was arrested as well, and held in prison until 1983. With the 
assistance  of  the  WCC,  he  managed  to  leave  Ethiopia  and  completed  his  PhD  at 
Princeton University in 1988. While in the USA he reportedly clashed with his long-time 
acquaintance Abba Yesehaq, the Archbishop of the Western Hemisphere Diocese, which 
is the umbrella diocese for Orthodox churches in Europe and America. Yesehaq seems to 
have  arranged  himself  with  the  Derg-aligned  hierarchies  and  defended  the  Derg's 
appointment of Theophilos'  successor.xxii Paulos on the other hand, probably collected 
Ethiopians opposing the Derg in his New York church, and did not accept Yesehaq’s 
authority.  He therefore,  was the ideal candidate to reverse the politics  of the church: 
standing  in  continuity  with  the  uncanonically  replaced  Theophilos,xxiii he  was  an 
opposition figure in exile and was well established internationally. 
Not surprisingly, it was Yesehaq who initiated and led the secession of the Western 
Hemisphere  Diocese,  when Patriarch  Merkorios  left  Ethiopia  for  Kenya in  1992 and 
claimed that he had not abdicated willfully. The exiled synod attracted Ethiopian clergy 
who were opposed to Paulos’ election and in 1997 Patriarch Merkorios relocated to the 
USA.  The  split  proliferated  to  a  number  of  Western  cities,  and  in  2007  Merkorios 
anointed  thirteen  bishops  for  the  exile  synod,  which  led  to  both  factions 
excommunicating each other.xxiv The exile synod claims that the election of Paulos, who 
is a Tigre like most high-ranking government officials, was an orchestrated coup by the 
EPRDF. However, other than the appointment of a new general secretary, there are no 
clear indications of direct government interventions, whereas it is clear that members of 
the church's hierarchy interested in reversing the previous political alignment effectively 
drove this process and used or welcomed government involvement in order to attain their 
goals.
This  conflation  of  church  and  EPRDF  politics  and  the  central  public  role  of 
Ethiopian Orthodoxy contributed  to  the  politicization  of  the EOC. Paulos’  opponents 
emphasize his ethnicity to paint him as a puppet of the EPRDF, and negative perceptions 
of the EPRDF usually translate into opposition toward Paulos as well.xxv In the bloody 
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aftermath of the 2005 elections, many hoped for a critical statement from the church and 
interpreted its call for peace as support for the EPRDF. This in turn led to the heckling of  
Paulos during the Meskel celebrations in September of the same year.xxvi The suppression 
of government critical prophesying monks or  bahitawis has played into this narrative, 
especially when in 1997 bahitawi Fekade Sellasie Tesfaye was shot and killed inside the 
St. Stephanos Church in Addis Ababa by one of Paulos guards.xxvii
Restricting public space
As seen from the statistics above, Islam has not experienced such a dramatic increase in 
numbers  as  Protestantism.  The  most  significant  change during  EPRDF rule  was  that 
Muslims have become far more visible  within Ethiopian public space.  Generally,  the 
increasing visibility of Islam is evident by the mushrooming of mosques throughout the 
country,  by  the  increase  of  “Muslim  clothing”,  such  as  hijab  among  women,  and 
skullcaps and white robes among males, as well as by the performance of religious ritual 
in public. 
More specifically, the new political climate in the early 1990s contributed to the 
institutionalization of Islam. A first important step was the de jure establishment of the 
EIASC in  1991,  and  the  restructuring  and  election  of  a  new  leadership  in  October 
1992.xxviii Other crucial organizations were the Ethiopian Muslim Youth Association and 
the Da'wa & Knowledge Association, both established in 1992. These organizations were 
heavily  focused  on  “reviving  Islam”  and  played  decisive  roles  in  making  religious 
literature available, in the construction of mosques and in supporting various forms of 
da’wa.xxix The early 1990s also saw the emergence of a number of Islamic magazines and 
various publishing houses – engaged in importing and translating religious texts from 
Arabic as well as publishing works by indigenous Muslim writers.xxx Islamic education 
became  more  structured  in  the  form  of  madrasas  with  teaching  structured  through 
classrooms,  defined  grade-levels,  and  syllabi.  While  such  madrasas  in  various  sizes 
appeared all over the country, a major one was the Awaliyah School & Mission Centre in  
Addis Ababa, which saw the adding of new departments and faculty during the 1990s. 
The school had been supported by the Saudi-based World Muslim League (MWL) since 
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1966, and in 1993, the formal ownership of the school was transferred to International 
Islamic Relief Organization, a branch of MWL.xxxi
While  the  developments  leading  to  a  more  organized  and  visible  Muslim 
community went relatively unchecked in the first half of the 1990s, the years 1995 and 
1996 became a watershed for organized Muslim activities. With reference to the growth 
in the number of mosques all over the country and the increasing number of Muslims 
holding governmental and public positions, Christians were becoming gradually worried 
over  Islam’s  increasingly visible  role  in  public  space.  The government  was similarly 
showing signs of concern over increased religious activism, which they perceived to be a 
trend of politicization of Islam. This fear was amplified by a demonstration in Addis 
Ababa in November 1994, when Muslims demanded that the shari’a should be included 
as  one of  the bases  for  the  national  constitution.  When worshippers  at  the al-Anwar 
mosque in  Addis  Ababa  clashed with  the  police  on  21 February 1995,  leaving nine 
people killed and over one hundred wounded, the government used this as an opportunity 
to  crack  down on  unwanted  developments  within  the  Muslim  community.xxxii In  the 
following days, hundreds of Muslims were imprisoned, suspected of involvement, and on 
the 22 February, armed police surrounded the offices of the Ethiopian Muslim Youth 
Association. All those present were arrested, and the offices were closed. The situation 
worsened  after  the  failed  assassination  attempt  against  the  Egyptian  president  Hosni 
Mubarak during his visit to Addis Ababa on June 26 the same year. Five of the attackers 
were killed on the spot, and it was later learned that the Egyptian organization Jama’a al-
Islamiyya, allegedly with the assistance of Sudan, was responsible for the assassination 
attempt.xxxiii The incident led to continued arrests, and to the extradition of Egyptian and 
Sudanese nationals. In addition, the bomb-attacks by the Somali al-Itihad al-Islamiyya on 
Ethiopian soil from May 1995 to April 1996 – and Ethiopia’s retaliation – further fuelled 
tensions. 
The ruling party’s reactions deprived Muslims of much of the freedoms they had 
acquired since 1991, and with the closure of Islamic organizations, it left the EIASC to 
emerge as the sole actor claiming to represent the Muslim population as a whole. The 
council’s vast apparatus and its close links with the government have effectively enabled 
the  latter  to  monitor  and  control  developments  within  the  Muslim  community.  The 
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council has on its side proved to be a loyal instrument in curbing unwanted movements – 
in particular the Salafi movement, or the Wahhabis, as it is referred to locally. In January 
2004, the EIASC voted to remove all executive members of the council, replacing them 
with staunch anti-Salafis. Interesting to note is that the voting session was attended by a 
representative  from the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  hegemonic  position  of  the 
EIASC  has  consequently  impinged  on  the  possibilities  of  forming  alternative 
organizations, which has contributed to a situation in which Islam in Ethiopia is highly 
informal  and  de-institutionalized.  An  effect  of  this  was,  however,  that  the  mosque 
became increasingly important,  to  a  certain  degree  representing  closed  space  for  the 
authorities and consequently encumbering their possibility to monitor the movements of 
the Muslim community. 
The  terror-attacks  on  9/11  and  increased  geopolitical  tensions  in  the  region 
spurred increased concern from the ruling party, and Ethiopian Muslims were publicly 
accused of aspiring to political power based on radical religious ideas.xxxiv The EPRDF’s 
fear of political Islam was exacerbated by the increasing strength of Islamist insurgents in 
Somalia,  and the political  takeover by the United Islamic Courts  (UIC) in June 2006 
sparked  concern  over  its  potential  effects  on  Ethiopia’s  Muslim  population.xxxv The 
Ethiopian response came in late  December 2006, when its  forces crossed the border, 
swiftly  ousting  the  weak,  yet  overconfident  UIC  from  power.  The  military  did  not 
manage, however, to defeat the violent insurgent movement al-Shabab, which filled the 
vacuum left by the UIC and gradually grew in strength. In January 2009 the Ethiopian 
forces vacated Somalia, leaving it to the African Union forces (AMISOM) to deal with 
the Islamist insurgency. The EPRDF has, however, continued to meddle in Somalia by 
supporting political factions, like the Sufi-oriented  Ahl al-Sunna wal Jama’a which it 
considers as representatives of a more “home-grown” tolerant and peaceful Islam – in 
contrast with Salafi actors perceived as representing a “foreign” militant Islam.
In convergence  with  this,  the  ruling  party undertook several  measures  further 
restricting the public space of Muslims in Ethiopia. In May and November 2007, the 
Ministry  of  Education  issued  drafts  for  a  law  addressing  the  question  of  religious 
expressions in public schools. The constitutional tension between freedom of religious 
expression (Art.  27) and the mandate to keep education free from religious influence 
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(Art. 90)xxxvi came to bear in the proposition to restrict the use of hijab and niqab in public 
schools, as well as the prohibition of congregational prayer within school premises.xxxvii 
Moreover,  realizing  that  it  was  unable  to  monitor  the  activities  within  the  growing 
number of mosques, the EPRDF issued, through the EIASC, in 2009 a registration-form 
to the country’s mosques, ordering them to submit information on how they were run, on 
the sources for income and whether the mosque was linked to any outside donors.xxxviii On 
23 February 2009 the government issued a ban on all Muslim religious activities which 
had not been approved on beforehand by the EIASC.xxxix There were also unconfirmed 
reports saying that the security apparatus had issued a list of nearly 100 Muslims to be 
arrested.xl No information on the background and reasons for  this  is  available,  but it 
seems that regional instability was an important factor.
Politics, religion, and the negotiation of public space
As  seen  so  far,  the  combination  of  policies  opening  space  for  religious  groups  and 
executive  actions  imposing  limits  on  the  same,  have  had  different  impacts  on  the 
religious  communities.  With regard  to  the  EOC, still  the most  visible  and influential 
religious force in Ethiopia, there seems to be a certain conflation of EPRDF and church 
interests,  which  arguably  is  driven  more  by  internal  church  politics  than  direct 
government intervention. The growing visibility of the Muslim community, on the other 
hand, has been subjected to increasing regulations and limitations, which are partially 
connected to the larger geopolitical developments in the region. Protestant churches, in 
turn,  have hardly been the target  of  direct  government  intervention and have  largely 
profited from the enforcement of religious plurality, while being structurally influenced 
by some of the government’s policies. 
These different trajectories have forced religious communities to apply certain 
strategies  when  moving  in  this  space,  which  become  apparent  in  the  production  of 
disparate narratives for the legitimization of religion in society, and in the demarcation of 
inter- and intra-religious boundaries being played out in the public once again. 
Political narratives
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The  EOC  has  reacted  to  its  loss  of  political  power  by  more  or  less  reiterating  its 
importance for the integrity and identity of the Ethiopian nation-state with historical and 
cultural arguments. A book published by the patriarchate in 1997 states, for example: 
“Our culture, our strength, our freedom, our unity and our basic teachings are built on the 
foundation of our church. Therefore our church is the symbol of unity and freedom for 
Ethiopia as a whole and all Ethiopians, and the center of spiritual and social ministry.”xli 
In  a  similar  way,  a  history  book  published  by the  Mahibere  Kidusanxlii affirms  the 
centrality  of  the  EOC  by  outlining  its  contributions  to  the  administrative  and  legal 
foundation  of  the  country,  its  cultural  and  social  life,  the  preservation  of  Ethiopia’s 
heritage, and the promotion of tourism.xliii Regretting the disintegration of this religio-
political unity, the publication bemoans the “attacks of radical Islam and the spread of 
mosques”  as  an  example  for  religious  organizations  which  infringe  the  rights  of  the 
Ethiopian  church  and  inflict  attacks  in  the  “name  of  freedom  of  religion  and 
democracy.”xliv Moreover,  the  incursion  of  “heretics”,  i.e.  Protestants,  is  seen  as  a 
contributing  factor  to  moral  decay and social  disintegration,  since  their  insistence  of 
salvation by grace and not by works has led to a decrease of “prayer, fasting, charity, 
self-control, solidarity, obedience, mutual respect, harmony, and similar goods.”xlv These 
and similar  statements,  pointing  to  the  dangers  of  religious  liberty in  contrast  to  the 
benefits of a close state-church alliance, affirm the political aspirations of the EOC and 
simultaneously outline its political strategy of compensating for the loss of power: By 
pointing  to  the  historical  and  cultural  heritage,  the  idea  of  an  essentially  Orthodox 
Ethiopia  is  upheld  and  defended  against  the  perceived threats  of  Westernization  and 
Islamic growth.
The political outlook of many Protestants, on the other hand, appears to be one of 
overt de-politicization, articulated in narratives of persecution and of personal faith in 
Jesus  Christ  as  the  solution  to  all  ailments  of  society.  Especially  Pentecostals  have 
learned to  tell  their  history as a story of oppression,  and in a  somewhat  triumphalist 
manner they portray the present religious liberties and the growth of Protestantism as 
rewards  for  previously  endured  sufferings.  This  legacy  of  persecution  is  also 
accompanied by a verdict  on past regimes. In his  Revival in Ethiopia the Pentecostal 
historian Bekele Woldekidan reflects on the legacy of Haile Selassie’s government and 
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tells how the emperor had been confronted with the gospel through various evangelists, 
but  failed  to  stop  the  persecution  of  Pentecostals.xlvi Bekele’s  verdict  is  clear:  “His 
government tried to stop God’s visitation, using the police force and judicial institutions. 
God in turn, used his own army and stopped that government.”xlvii Though the  Derg  is 
seen here as God's instrument to end imperial rule, it is soon judged in similar terms, 
since  it  too  oppressed  the  revival  movements.  Such  narratives  of  course  contain  an 
implicit  political  proclamation  for  present-day  Ethiopia  as  well:  the  possibilities  for 
Protestant  evangelization  define  the  character  and  survival  prospects  of  Ethiopia’s 
governments. This missionary zeal is connected to the assumption that only converted 
and sanctified believers will be able to abstain from corruption, improve the economy, 
and  bring  social  change  that  lasts.  The  former  prime  minister  of  the  Transitional 
Government, Tamrat Layne, became one of the most prominent proponents of this idea. 
In 1996 he fell out with Meles Zenawi, was imprisoned for twelve years on charges of 
fraud, and converted to Protestantism during this time. After his release he asserted that 
he would abstain from politics, since, in his opinion, Ethiopia could only be improved 
through people turning to Jesus Christ.xlviii His testimony was given center stage in the 
biggest Pentecostal Church in Addis Ababa and received standing ovations.xlix
A notable exception to this  overtly apolitical  outlook may be the EECMY who 
holds a special political heritage in the memory of its former general secretary Gudina 
Tumsa. Especially during the transition period, the church attempted to revive Tumsa’s 
political  legacy and spoke out against  different human rights violations.l However,  in 
recent years there has been less evidence of such involvement, which arguably has to do 
with the ethno-political conflict in the midst of the church and the growing influence of 
the Pentecostal political narrative.
While the developments in 1995/96 impinged on Muslims’ access to public space, 
they did not diminish their  engagement in politics.  It  needs to be noted,  though, that 
Muslim views on politics has taken a different form than the often portrayed notion of 
seeking  power  based  on  Islamic  political  preferences.  The  Salafis  have  in  general 
refrained from partaking in political debates, yet their view on politics – as forwarded by 
a  range  of  Salafi  informants  –  has  largely  been  congruent  with  the  official  secular 
paradigm of the EPRDF, in which they argue that in a heterogeneous religious society 
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like  Ethiopia,  religious  freedom and  equality  for  the  different  groups  could  only  be 
secured under a secular government.li The group most explicitly advocating involvement 
in politics is the so-called Intellectualist movement. Highly informal and devoid of any 
organizational structure, this rather elitist movement evolved around certain individuals 
advocating a set of ideas. It has been ideologically affiliated to the mainstream version of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and has been actively disseminating the ideas of Hassan al-
Banna,  and  in  particular  those  of  Yusuf  al-Qaradawi  to  the  Muslim public.  Initially 
surfacing on the campuses of Addis Ababa University and other institutions of higher 
learning in the early 1990s, it soon gained popularity among Muslim students. Outside 
the campuses,  the movement was able  to  exert  influence through public  lectures  and 
through regular contributions in Islamic magazines. Referring to discrimination found in 
Ethiopia’s past, the Intellectualists have been much concerned with the legitimate place 
for  Muslims  in  Ethiopian  society,  worked  for  equal  representation  of  Christians  and 
Muslims in public life,  and argued for the creation of a secular political  environment 
safeguarding  and facilitating  mutual  respect  between  the  religions  and their  peaceful 
coexistence. 
The resurgence  of  the  Takfir  wal  Hijralii in  Jimma around 2005 pointed  to  a 
politicization of Islam. Taking an exclusivist position towards both Salafi and non-Salafi 
Muslims, the group has moreover assumed a radical position toward the Ethiopian state, 
seen among others by their refusal to hold ID cards and to pay taxes. When this was 
stated  publicly in  2009,  the  EPRDF decided to  send in  the  army,  leading to  violent 
clashes  with  the  Takfiris  and  to  the  imprisonment  of  allegedly  over  1500  men  and 
women.liii While the Takfiris probably see the establishment of an Islamist political order 
as  desirable  but  unrealistic,  they  may  opt  for  an  isolationist  strategy,  detaching 
themselves from state and societal structures, seeking to carve out both symbolic and 
territorial space for the realization of their ideological preferences. 
It seems that Muslims in the last decade have become increasingly critical of the 
EPRDF. From initially being supportive of the federalist system and subscribing to the 
secularist  ideology  of  the  state’s  non-involvement  in  religious  affairs,  the  lack  of 
democratization in general, the perceived bias towards the Christians, the intervention in 
Somalia,  and  the  monitoring  of  the  Muslim  community  are  creating  more  negative 
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attitudes  towards  the  ruling  party.  A  particularly  burning  issue  is  the  ruling  party’s 
interference in the EIASC, which not only is  seen as a  breach of their  constitutional 
rights, but also as depriving Muslims of independent representations and dividing them as 
a community. 
Demarcating intra-religious boundaries 
The  rise  of  Protestant  Christianity  has  led  to  considerable  tensions  between  the  two 
Christian blocks, which are deepened by their different political narratives. Moreover, 
Protestants often invoke a renewal rhetoric, which may turn into polemics, for example 
when they allege that the EOC has blurred the message of Christianity with its veneration 
of saints and elaborate ritual practices, and therefore must be brought back to the faith of 
the early church.liv The resulting conflicts from these contrasting outlooks were not only 
manifest in public riots and condemnations but run right through many families, where 
they frequently take on the nature of inter-generational conflicts.lv The Mahibere Kidusan 
explicitly addresses this point by targeting the educated youth, but their apologetic and 
unnuanced characterization of Protestants arguably contributes to widening the gap.
The  increasing  “Pentecostalization”  of  Protestantism  has  further  hardened  the 
fronts.  The highly visible and audible nature of Pentecostal services puts them into direct 
competition with the EOC, and their strict prohibition of alcohol and dancing tends to 
divide social activities and family gatherings. In addition, Pentecostalism has helped to 
vitalize and contextualize mainstream Protestant churches, putting them in more direct 
competition with Orthodox nationalism.
 Pentecostalism  has  also  reached  the  EOC  itself  in  the  form  of  Orthodox 
Charismatic movements, some of which have come into conflict and broken away from 
the church. The most prominent example of this was the Ammanuel Fellowship (now 
Ammanuel United Church), which began as a prayer fellowship in Nazaret in 1991, left 
the church in 1995, and became increasingly Protestant in the following years until it 
finally joined the ECFE in 2004. Similar groups aiming to stay within the EOC, often 
congregate in secret, because the division between the largely Pentecostal Protestants and 
Orthodox Christians has left little room for hybrid Charismatic identities.
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Intra-religious tensions among Muslims have been much related to the growth of 
the  Salafi  movement.  While  the  Salafis’  attacks  on  pilgrimages  to  shrines,  on  saint 
veneration, and on other practices that are seen as ‘contaminating the true faith’ have 
provoked tensions and divisions among Muslims in Ethiopia, Salafism experienced, at 
the same time, internal fragmentation with the surfacing of what may be referred to as the 
so-called  Ahl  al-Sunna  movement,  which  attracted  followers  largely from the  young 
generation. This faction favoured a stricter interpretation of the Salafi tenets, in many 
instances leading to conflict with the senior Salafis. Pertinent issues that were addressed 
referred to morality and individual religiosity among the young generation in the 1990s, 
like agitating against alcohol, tobacco,  khat, TV and pop-music, or prescribing certain 
codes of dress and personal appearance. The most radical wing of the Ahl al-Sunna came 
to be represented by the already mentioned Takfir wal Hijra grouping.
Intra-religious  tensions  in  Ethiopia  have  also  been  related  to  the  already 
mentioned Intellectualist movement and the  Tabligh. The latter is probably the largest 
Islamic movement in Ethiopia, and seems to have arrived in Ethiopia in the early 1970s, 
by way of South African and Kenyan Tabligh missionaries, attracting followers among 
the Gurage community in Addis Ababa. Its activities remained limited under the  Derg, 
resurfacing in 1991. Extensively focused on  da’wa,  Tabligh missionaries are sent out 
from its markaz (centre) in Kolfe area in Addis Ababa to various parts of the country. In 
accordance with Tabligh’s principle of self-reliance, all the missionaries are supposed to 
take  care  of  their  own  expenses,  thus  making  the  movement  independent  from any 
outside funding.
Inter-religious relations
Inter-religious relations in Ethiopia have deteriorated in recent decades, with an increase 
of skirmishes and violent clashes between Christians and Muslims. Many of the concrete 
conflicts  between Christians  and Muslims  have  been  due  to  competition  over  public 
space in the literal sense – connected to construction of mosques or churches, as well as 
to celebrations of religious holidays. Clashes have mostly been of a local nature, the level 
of violence has been relatively low, and they do not reflect religiously coordinated efforts 
in  augmenting tensions.  Therefore,  the inter-religious conflict  and the high degree of 
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violence that occurred around Jimma and in Beghi (Wollega) in 2006 came as a surprise 
to many. The conflict erupted in connection with the celebration of  Timket  in a village 
outside of Jimma, and gradually spread to the Beghi area. It resulted in casualties on both 
sides, churches were burned, and unconfirmed reports tell about Christians being forced 
to convert to Islam.lvi It is interesting to note that the group most actively involved in the 
conflict was said to “oppose paying tax to the government” and detaching themselves 
from the Christians and denouncing other  Muslims – pointing in the direction of the 
Takfir  wal  Hijrah.lvii Having  said  this,  it  is  obvious  that  the  conflict  was  far  more 
complex. 
The current fragile situation involves a number of disparate actors, and remains 
related to the particular legacy of Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia feeding in to 
today’s religious discourses both within the Christian and Muslim communities. Whereas 
the peaceful  relationship between Christians  and Muslims in  Ethiopia has  often been 
celebrated by both Ethiopians and foreign observers, this remains a simplification of a far 
more complex picture. Christians-Muslims relations on the micro-level have been of a 
seemingly harmonic character,  yet  relations on the macro-level  have in contrast  been 
more antagonistic,  shaped by recurrent conflicts  in the past.  From the Christian side, 
emerging as victorious from the historic inter-religious conflicts, this enmity in turn laid 
the foundation for pejorative and hostile attitudes towards Islam, as well as to a religious 
fault-line in which Islam was perceived as a possible external threat.  This has led to 
policies  of  alienation,  marginalization,  and  subjugation,  and  the  crucial  point  is  that 
peaceful inter-religious coexistence to a large degree was made possible because of an 
asymmetric relationship between the two, in which Orthodox Christians controlled the 
main political institutions and defined the Muslims as second-class. 
Since 1991, this pattern has been dramatically reversed. This rise in Muslim-
Christian  tensions  is  arguably  due  to  the  new  religious  plurality  abolishing  this 
asymmetry. As constitutional changes and political reforms have highlighted Ethiopia’s 
religious diversity, feelings of hope and expectations have emerged as well as discomfort 
and  fear.  Christians  are  in  general  seeing  the  rapid  growth  of  mosques  and Muslim 
representation in public life as a proof of a strategy of Islamization. As was shown above, 
Orthodox Christians view this as a sign of a disintegrating Ethiopian nation, bemoaning 
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that the “contemporary religious equilibrium is collapsing very quickly,”lviii and becoming 
fearful of “Islamic fundamentalism” produced by local discourses, regional tensions and 
the  global  “war  on  terror”  narrative.  Whereas  the  latter  notion  is  equally  shared  by 
Protestants, they are more emphatic in their attempts to convert Muslims in all regions of 
Ethiopia, partially combined with a perspective of “spiritual warfare” in combating “the 
evil  forces  of  Islam.”  From the  Muslim  side,  the  more  fragile  relationship  towards 
Christians has produced intense debates about their position in the Ethiopian society and 
vis-à-vis the other religious groups. It has rekindled the image of being victimized, both 
in relation to the Orthodox understanding of Ethiopia as a “Christian Island”, seen as 
continuation of past discriminatory sentiments, and in connection to the Protestant efforts 
in evangelizing them.lix 
Leading to  a  more  clear-cut  demarcation  of  religiously marked boundaries  this 
divide  is  aggravated  through  the  production  of  polemic  literature  and  audio-visual 
materials, through which both Muslims and Christians are forwarding negative images of 
the other.  Books, VCDs, CDs and DVDs of this nature are made available for mass-
consumption, both as translations and as locally produced material.
Conclusions
In contrast to previous governments, the EPRDF has sought to accommodate the role of 
religion in the Ethiopian society. It has provided more space for the country’s religions, 
separate  from state  and politics,  and constitutionally  enshrined religious  equality  and 
freedom of  consciousness.  However,  the  EPRDF has  not  fully  succeeded in  keeping 
religions and politics apart. As this paper has demonstrated, the ruling party has been 
carefully monitoring the space it has provided, and has on numerous occasions interfered 
in religious matters.
Increased  religious  activism  and  fragile  inter-religious  relations  have  spurred 
Protestants, Orthodox and Muslims to create their own, and largely competing narratives 
on the meaning of Ethiopia. Drawing upon Ethiopian historiography in a highly selective 
manner, each of these narratives has generated particular perceptions of the “other” and 
politics in general. For the EOC, the EPRDF take-over has entailed a severe realignment, 
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from the reversal  of  the political  co-optation  under  the  Derg to  the  loss  of  previous 
political privileges. Increasingly challenged by the growth of Protestantism, the church 
has  sought  to  transcend the  idea  of  religious  equality by reiterating  its  centrality  for 
Ethiopian history and identity, a notion which is contested by Protestants and Muslims 
alike.
Protestants on the other hand, have largely profited from the new political climate, 
which for the first time awarded them official recognition on par with the other religious 
communities. Their growth, however, is nevertheless shaped and guided by actions of the 
executive,  most  of  all  in  relation  to  registration  and  land  leases.  Therefore,  the 
prominence of the persecution narrative among Protestants can be read as an implicit 
protest against potential government overreach.
Among Ethiopia’s Muslim there is an increasing yearning for building unity,  in 
which religion is gaining ground as point of identification. One question is whether this 
will supersede ethnic boundaries, and another question is how the Ethiopian government 
and the public will react to this development. The lack of a real democratization process, 
the continued marginalization of Muslim communities – coupled with regional tensions 
and global  conflicts  – could potentially radicalize Ethiopian Muslims and lead to the 
emergence  of  groups  favouring  stronger  detachment  from  the  wider  society  and 
forwarding a more exclusivist agenda. 
The emergence of a  pluralized religious factor in Ethiopian politics therefore is 
connected to vital questions of nationhood, identity and representations, which are likely 
to  remain  significant  as  Ethiopia  re-appropriates  its  legacy.   In  this  sense  religion 
constitutes a significant force and is likely to remain relevant in the years to come.  
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